From Tanning Accessory to Health Necessity: History of the OTC Sunscreen Monograph in Light of the Sunscreen Revolution by Matlack, Sarah
 
From Tanning Accessory to Health Necessity: History of the OTC
Sunscreen Monograph in Light of the Sunscreen Revolution
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Sarah Matlack, From Tanning Accessory to Health Necessity:
History of the OTC Sunscreen Monograph in Light of the
Sunscreen Revolution (2009).
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:21:36 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8965570
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FROM TANNING ACCESSORY TO HEALTH NECESSITY: HISTORY OF THE 
OTC SUNSCREEN MONOGRAPH IN LIGHT OF THE SUNSCREEN 
REVOLUTION. 
 
 
  SARAH MATLACK  
FOOD & DRUG LAW  
WINTER 2009  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sarah Matlack  
Food & Drug Law, Winter 2009  
  2 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  
 
On August 27, 2007 the FDA published a Proposed Amendment to the Final Monograph 
for Over-the-Counter Sunscreen Drug Products. The proposed regulations marks major 
progress in the regulation of sunscreen products, because it includes, for the first time, 
comprehensive regulations addressing testing and labeling standards for both UVB and 
UVA regulation. Developing a monograph for sunscreen products, however, has been an 
arduous administrative process that has spanned over 30 years and produced significant 
criticism of the FDA. This article examines the regulation of sunscreen products in light 
of cultural and scientific developments that governed the rise and revolution of the 
sunscreen industry arguing that, for the most part, FDA has responded with impressive 
flexibility and attention to dynamic technological advancements, transformation of 
consumer expectations, and uncertain science.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Sarah Matlack  
Food & Drug Law, Winter 2009  
  3 
INTRODUCTION 
   Man has historically had an ambivalent relationship with the sun.
1 Nowhere has 
this love-hate affair been played out with more enthusiasm than in the last century in the 
United States. The fashion of suntanning has endured alongside new scientific evidence 
warning of the risks of sunburn, photoaging, and skin cancer.
2 Since first emerging on the 
market in the 1920s, manufacturers of sunscreen products have had to constantly reinvent 
the product in response to technological advancements, better scientific information on 
the health risks of UV radiation, and the evolution of consumer expectations and 
demands.  
Recently, as the agency responsible for regulating sunscreen products
3, the Food 
and Drug Administration [“FDA”] has received much criticism for its failure to 
adequately protect consumers from the dangers of UV radiation.
4 However, much of the 
external pressure and demands
5 that FDA finalize regulations fails to recognize the 
difficulty of reviewing for safety and efficacy a product that is at the center of dynamic 
                                                 
1 See I. Muller, Sun and Man: An Ambivalent Relationship in the History of Medicine, in SKIN 
CANCER AND UV RADIATION 1, 1-12 (P. Altmeyer et al eds. 1997).  
2 Kerry Segrave, SUNTANNING IN 20
TH CENTURY AMERICA 183 (2005) (noting that “[l]ess than 
100 years after the suntan’s tentative arrival among white people as a medical aid and fashion, it 
had been driven back, as a killer. However, it remained a fashion and therefore still claimed 
adherents.”).  
3 “The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, efficacy, and 
security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical devices, our nation’s food 
supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.” FDA’s Mission Statement, 
http://www.fda.gov/opacom /morechoices/mission.html (last visited April 3, 2009)  
4 See, e.g., Who’s Protecting Us, http://www.cosmeticsdatabase.com/special/sunscreens 
2008/report_protection.php (last visited April 17, 2009) (articulating a diverse range of problems 
for consumer safety as a result of FDA inaction). 
5 The FDA’s delay in finalizing sunscreen regulations has not gone unnoticed. See Id. 
(remarking that the delay has spurred nine class-action false advertising suits against 
sunscreen manufacturers, a petition by a state attorney general, and at least two written 
requests from seven senators). Members of Congress have also introduced legislation on 
several occasions in an attempt to mandate the finalization of the sunscreen monograph.  
See, FDA Modernization Act §129, 21 U.S.C. §393 (2008); Natasha Singer, Bill Seeks 
Action on Stricter Sunscreen Rules, N.Y. Times, August 2, 2008, at A16. Sarah Matlack  
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scientific discovery. Furthermore, the critics fail to appreciate the progress made in the 
proposed regulations as a result of the effort and flexibility of the FDA in adapting 
sunscreen regulations to the current state of scientific knowledge.  
This Note examines FDA’s ongoing review of Over-the-Counter [“OTC”] 
sunscreen drug products in light of cultural and scientific developments that have 
influenced American consumers’ expectations and perceptions of sunscreen products. 
Part I outlines the birth of the tanning fashion, the subsequent negative media campaign 
warning of the dangers of UV radiation, and the evolution of the sunscreen market over 
this period. Part II examines how sunscreen products are regulated under the Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act and outlines the OTC drug monograph system. Examining several 
notable provisions of the 1999 Final Monograph [“FM”]
6 and the 2007 Proposed 
Amendment, Part III demonstrates how drastically sunscreen products have changed 
throughout the 30-year regulatory process and how FDA has striven to ensure that 
sunscreen regulations reflect the latest scientific discoveries and technological advances. 
Finally, Part IV discusses the current obstacles to finalizing the sunscreen monograph and 
identifies several areas where future action by FDA is necessary to adequately protect 
consumers.  
I.  HISTORY OF TANNING AND THE SUNSCREEN INDUSTRY. 
                                                 
6 Despite the passage of a final monograph in 1999 in response to the FDA 
Modernization Act, there still does not exist finalized regulations for sunscreen drug 
products, because the implementation date for the FM has been stayed indefinitely. See 
Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Final Monograph; Partial 
Stay, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,485, 67,485 – 67,487 (December 31, 2001) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 352).  Sarah Matlack  
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Understanding why “[s]unscreen is the hot potato”
7 of over-the-counter drug regulations 
is impossible without exploring the reasons that millions of Americans engage in the 
obsessive summer suntanning ritual despite inexorable warnings about all the dangers 
posed by UV radiation. What is most peculiar is that Americans have only been 
subjecting themselves to the tanning fashion and all its inevitable maladies since the 
1920s.
8  Prior to that time (and for millennia before)
9 “fair skin had been prized” and the 
“Gibson Girl with parasol aloft”
10 was the epitome of American beauty. In the early 20
th 
century, however, the forces of medicine, media, and fashion collided, transforming tan 
skin from a “stigmata of the lower classes” into the symbol of “virility and wealth.”
11  
Much of the “groundwork for establishing the suntan as an admirable, healthy, and 
worthy goal was laid in the 1890s as medical science refocused
12 on the power of the sun 
                                                 
7 Natasha Singer, Proposed Sunscreen Labels on Hold for Now, N.Y. Times, June 31, 2008, at 
G3. 
8 Virginia Lee Warren, The Suntan Question: Is the Ritual Worth It?, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1973 
(noting that Caucasians have only “been subjecting themselves to the sun in their present fashion 
for no more than 50 years (some estimates say less than 30)).  
9 As early as 2000 B.C. the cultural preference in Egypt for light skin caused women to use 
preparations consisting of tirmis, lotus oil, henna oil, calcite powder, rice bran extracts, and clay 
in efforts to protect themselves from the sun’s darkening rays. See W. Raab, History of 
Therapeutic UV Radiation, in SKIN CANCER AND UV RADIATION 13, 13 (P. Altmeyer, et al eds. 
1997); Nadim A. Shaath, Sunscreen Evolution, in SUNSCREENS: REGULATION AND COMMERCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 3, 4 (Nadim A. Shaath ed., 3rd ed. 2005). Likewise, “tan was not palatable to 
ancient Greeks” and women adorned themselves in protective clothing, hats, and veils to avoid 
exposure to the sun. Paul U. Giacomoni, Sunprotection: Historical Perspective, in SUNSCREENS: 
REGULATIONS AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT (Nadim A. Shaath ed., 3
rd ed. 2005). Even in 
more modern times, creamy white skin was the epitome of class and the desire to avoid a tan 
motivated fashionable women since the Elizabethan age too shield their faces with hats and 
bonnets, draw the curtains, and avoid the outdoors. See Lois W. Banner, AMERICAN BEAUTY 40-
41 (1983). 
10 John J. Abele, Suntan Lotions Enjoying Day in Sun, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1957.  
11 Warren, supra note 8.  
12 In the late 1800s and early 1900s medical Science re-focused on the curative power of the sun 
that was previously touted by Ancient Greek, Roman and Arabic physicians. See, e.g. Raab, supra 
note 9, at 14 (explaining that around 400 B.C. Hippocrates recommend sunlight to correct 
dyscrasias (a false mixture of the four bodily juices) and that both Roman and Arabic physicians 
prescribed sun treatment to patients with an array of cardial. pulmonal, and orthopedic problems).  Sarah Matlack  
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as healer.”
13 Heliotherapy - the practice of systematically exposing patients to prolonged 
sunbaths in an effort to cure disease and promote health - became a well-respected and 
popular medical treatment after experiments and observations in the late 1800s and early 
1900s revealed the curative power of the sun.
14 Although modern claims regarding “light 
and air” treatment were largely ignored at first
15, by the 1890s the medical community 
had embraced sunlight as a treatment for Tuberculosis.
16 In 1903 the Nobel Prize in 
Physiology or Medicine was awarded to Danish scientist Neils Ryberg Finsen for his 
work demonstrating the stimulating effect of the sun’s rays on human tissue and devising 
a sun treatment for lupus.
17 After the publication of Finsen’s 1893 treatise Lysets 
Indvirkninger paa Huden (On the effects of light on the skin), sunlight was tried as a cure 
for almost all dermatoses and was also subsequently proven as a cure for Rickets in 
1919.
18 Inundated with evidence of the sun’s miraculous powers, physicians soon began 
to recommend that even healthy individuals take sunbaths whenever and wherever 
possible. 
19 Although many of the claims made by the medical community and reported 
unflaggingly by journalists were extremely exaggerated,
20 the hype began to reverse 
negative perceptions of the sun and help turn tanning into a huge fad. 
                                                 
13 Segrave, supra note 2, at 4. 
14 See Segrave, supra note 2, at 14. 
15 See Id. at 13 (noting that the medical establishment ignored claims by English physician Dr. 
George Boddington in the 1830s that he successfully cured his consumptive patients with long 
periods of outdoor exposure). 
16 See Id.  
17 See Biography of Niels Ryberg Finsen, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine 
/laureates/1903/finsen-bio.html (last visited April 19, 2008).  
18Raab, supra note 9, at 15-17.  
19 See Segrave, supra note 2, at 5. See also Simon Carter, RISE AND SHINE: SUNLIGHT, 
TECHNOLOGY AND HEALTH, 100 (2007) (explaining that articles in medical journals began 
talking less in terms of curative outcomes for specific diseases and more about general health 
enhancement from sun exposure).  
20 Not all heliotherapy claims were unfounded, but most have been replaced by more efficient 
modern treatments. “Today there remains three medical indications for ultraviolet rays: (1) Sarah Matlack  
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  In addition to the promise of health benefits, tanning became more fashionable 
when the negative connotations of tanned skin began to fade. For centuries smooth fair 
complexion had been the epitome of fashion. Creamy white skin was not only rare 
(owing to the high occurrence of deforming disease, such as smallpox) but was a class-
marker, reflecting the luxury of remaining away from the fieldwork and out of the sun.
21 
However, the Industrial Revolution “put the lower classes indoors and their interminable 
hours with never a vacation gave them a pale sickly look.”
22 Around the same time, 
outdoor sports and leisure activities increased in popularity and became status symbols. 
23 
Tan, not pale skin, came to represent elite leisure and wealth - symbolizing “holidays, 
sailing and swimming, all of which were highly fashionable pursuits that entailed 
exposing the body.”
24  
The rise of a middle class and the women’s movement further increased the 
popularity of tanning. In the 1920s women’s sports became a notable social revolution 
advocating freedom of movement and “the casting off of hampering clothes.”
25 Tanning 
was “democratized” in the 1930s as a growing middle class enjoyed greater access to 
vacation and leisure through expansion of the railroad network and affordability of 
automobiles, shortening and regulation of the workweek as part of the New Deal, and 
                                                                                                                                                
Rickets, as first recommended by Hilschinsky in 1919 (2) Jaundice of newborns, a method 
developed by Cremer in 1959 (3) Season depression, in accordance with Kern 1957.” See Raab, 
supra note 9, at 15.  
21 See Banner, supra note 9, 40-41. 
22 See Warren, supra note 8.  
23 In the 1920s tanning became fashionable in French Riviera resorts promoted by fashionable 
tabloid figures such as Coco Chanel and quickly  “lost its proletarian connotations of outdoor 
work.” Rebecca Arnold, AMERICAN LOOK: FASHION, SPORTSWEAR AND THE IMAGE OF WOMEN 
IN 1930S AND 1940S NEW YORK 50 (2009). See Also, Giacomoni, supra note 9, at 75. The tanned 
image of Coco Chanel is so iconic that many accounts attribute the emergence  of the tanning 
fashion entirely to her personal devotion to the sport of sunbathing. See Segrave, supra note 2, at 
3.  
24Arnold, supra note 23, at 50.  
25 Segrave, supra note 2, at 35. Sarah Matlack  
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widespread construction of public tennis courts, golf courts and swimming pools as part 
of New Deal Social Programs.
26 By 1940s sunbathing had so ingrained itself in popular 
culture, that newspapers, embracing the trend, published tanning-how to articles - the 
“Tan Commandments” – promising readers the best bronze without the burn in ten easy 
steps.
27 
The sunscreen industry was an inevitable byproduct of the tanning fashion, because 
“[a]long with the fashion of tanning came the bane of sunburn.”
28 By 1911 researchers 
began specifically investigating chemical combinations for sunscreens.
29 The first 
commercial sunscreen product was developed in 1928 in the United States, but solutions 
also quickly appeared in Australia in the 1930s, and in 1935 L’Oreal launched Ambre 
Solaire on the French Riviera.
30 Even more research was invested in developing effective 
sunscreen products during WWII when the Army Air Force Material Center contracted 
with researchers from General Electric Lighting Laboratories and the Western Reserve 
Medical School to help test substances that could be used to prevent sunburn among 
                                                 
26 See Daniel Delis Hill, AS SEEN IN VOGUE: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN FASHION IN 
ADVERTISING 158-59 (2004); Banner, supra note 9, at 276-277.  
27 See, e.g., Carloyn Abbott, “Suntanning Can be Both Painless and Beautifying if Precautions 
Are Used” The Washington Post August 10, 1941: Carolyn Abbott “City Suntan is as Attractive 
as Beach Variety” The Washington Post July 2, 1942.  
28 Even before specific sunscreen formulations were invented, sunbathers were advised to expose 
their skin slowly in order to build up a natural tan, touted as the best defense against an unwanted 
burn. Home remedies such as the application of cold cream, coco butter or zinc oxide were also 
recommended. See Segrave, supra note 2, at 28; Teresa Riordan, INVENTING BEAUTY: A 
HISTORY OF THE INNOVATIONS THAT HAVE MADE US BEAUTIFUL, 150, (2004)(noting that in 1907 
the T.T. Pond Company advertised a “vanishing cream” that promised to help the Out-of-Doors 
girl easily avoid the unpleasant effects of the sun including sunburn, freckles and Chaps); Suntan 
Lotion Sales Booming; Volume, Up 11% at 20 Million, N.Y. Times July 4
th, 1962, 21 (explaining 
that after years of exposing themselves bare to the sun, people “developed their own home 
remedies or bought products, like baby oil or mineral oil and lodine which were not made for sun 
protection but could be used for that purpose”). 
29 See Henry W. Lim, Quantum Leaps: New, Improved Sunscreens have Arrived, The Skin 
Cancer Foundation Journal Vol. XXVI (2008), available at http://www.skincancer.org/scf-
journal-2008.html. 
30 See Id.; See also Shaath, supra note 9, at 4. See also Carter, supra 19, at 102. Sarah Matlack  
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soldiers serving in the South Pacific.
31 Benjamin Green (future founder of Coppertone) 
invented Red Veterinary Petroleum (“Red Vet Pet”), which fulfilled military needs, but 
the sticky red substance was not conducive, for obvious aesthetic reasons, to civilian 
use.
32 A major development in the technology of the early sunscreen market occurred in 
1943 when researchers discovered that Para-aminobenzoic acid, a vitamin B, helped 
cause sunburn by absorbing UV rays.
33 The researches patented PABA as a UVB 
absorber and developed a salve that provided reasonably effective sunburn protection.
34  
  Although sun-protection products were immediately popular with sunbathers and 
the sunscreen industry grew rapidly, the initial therapeutic purpose of the product was 
limited.
35 Early sunscreens were intended only to serve as tanning aids: “The basic job of 
the suntan preparation is to screen out the burning rays of the sun - the high-energy ultra-
violet rays-and admit the tanning rays.”
36 Early sunscreen formulations purposely 
                                                 
31 See Lim, supra note 29. 
32 See Id; See also Shaath, supra note 9, at 4; See also June Weir, Summer Sense, N.Y. Times, 
May 9, 1982.  
33 See Segrave supra note 2, at 29-31.  
34 See Id., at 31 (remarking that PABA-based lotions unlike other sunscreen products of the time, 
was stable, did not soil clothing, was colorless and odorless, did not irritate the skin and was 
effective to an extent.). But See Lim, supra note 29 (describing the sharp decline in PABA’s 
popularity by the 1980’s due to its causing skin allergies and yellow staining on clothing).  
35 See Abbott, supra note 27 (extolling on the virtues of suntanning preparations and remarking 
how the sunscreen market had almost doubled from 1951 until 1956 when the sales were 
$9,200,000.); Suntan Lotion Sales Booming; Volume  Up 11%, at 20 Million, N.Y. Times, July 4, 
1963( explaining that “to help them get a glorious tan without the painful sunburn, a major 
industry has developed supported by 100,000,000 Americans. Today the total market for suntan 
products stands at an estimated $20,000,000, up 11 per cent from last year’s total.).  
36See Abele, supra note 10 (explaining that “the basic job of the suntan preparation is to screen 
out the burning rays of the sun –the high-energy ultra-violet rays - and admit the tanning rays); 
Suntan Lotion Sales Booming supra note 28, at 21 (describing how suntan lotions promote 
tanning that results when melanin to rises to the skin’s surface after sun exposure, but block 
exposure to the solar ultra-violet rays).   Sarah Matlack  
Food & Drug Law, Winter 2009  
  10 
protected only against only UVB rays, believing the UVA rays to be both harmless and 
necessary to produce a tanning reaction.
 37  
The second half of the twentieth century, however, gave birth to a sun-scare that 
revolutionized sun-protection products. New evidence indicating the relationship between 
UV rays and skin damage, ominous warnings from Doctor’s seeing epidemic-like 
increases in skin cancer rates, and environmental reports on Ozone depletion finally 
collided to produce frantic reports from media portraying the sun as a killer.
38 Although 
today it is commonly believed that the sunscreen will help prevent skin cancer, this fact is 
misleading first, because it fails to distinguish between three distinct diseases - Basal Cell 
Carcinoma, Squamos Cell Carcinoma, and Melanoma
39 - and secondly, because it 
overstates the scientific evidence supporting this conclusion.
40 Many medical experts 
                                                 
37 The sun’s rays reach earth in 3 main radiation wavelengths. UVC rays are the shortest 
wavelength, highest energy rays and are potentially the most dangerous to humans, but these rays 
are absorbed almost entirely by the ozone layer. UVB rays are longer and lower in energy, but 
penetrate the earth’s surface causing erythema. See Rebecca Voelker, SKIN CARE AND REPAIR 5-
6 (2002). UVA rays, or “tanning rays” are the longest wavelength and penetrate the skin deep into 
the dermis layer stimulating the formulation of melanin. Until the 1970s they were considered 
fairly harmless until more recent evidence implicated contribution of these weaker rays to 
development of skin cancer, DNA damage and photaging. See Shaath, supra note 8, at 5.  
38 “In the years prior to 1946, the sun was overwhelmingly portrayed as the health-giving healer, 
capable of performing miracles through the contact of its rays with the skin…If that period was 
marked by outrageous claims and excess in favor of the sun – and it was – the post-war period 
was marked by a reverse trend in which the sun was portrayed as killer. That trend moved very 
slowly over the 1950s through the 1970s but then picked up speed rapidly in the 1980s; a trend 
that has continued through the present.” Segrave, supra note 2, at 61 
39 See Nina G. Jablonski, SKIN: A NATURAL HISTORY 137 (2006) (explaining that “skin cancer is 
not a single entity but rather a family of conditions). See Rebecca Voelker, SKIN CARE AND 
REPAIR 14-16 (2002. See A. Scholz,  History of Skin Cancer, in SKIN CANCER AND UV 
RADIATION 20, 20 (P. Altmeyer et. al. eds. 1997) 
40 No scientific evidence exists linking regular sunscreen use with reduce risk of basal cell 
carcinoma or melanoma, and the evidence suggesting that regular use of sunscreen will reduce 
the risk of squamos cell carcinoma is limited. See H. Lui, R.P. Gallagher, and D.I. Mclean, Use 
and Misuse of Sunscreens, in SKIN CANCER AND UV RADIATION 333, 336-8 (P. Altmeyer et. al 
eds. 1997). Although evidence linking sun exposure to certain forms of skin cancer has been 
accumulating since the turn of the century See T.R. Van Dellen, How to Keep Well, Chicago 
Daily Tribune, May 25, 1958, 16 (claiming that “[it] has been known for 60 years that sunlight is 
a cause of skin cancer); Segrave, supra note 13, at 57 (noting that an early warning of the sun’s Sarah Matlack  
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now believe that UV rays are risk factors in the development of all three cancers and 
most medical experts agree that sunscreen is an important component of a skin cancer 
prevention regiment, but the science is by no means clear and researchers continue to 
debate the causal relationships among UV radiation and skin cancer and sunscreen and 
prevention.
41 Neither the media, consumers, nor sunscreen manufactures have remained 
so skeptical. The public was quickly gripped by reports of the albeit statistically 
inconclusive evidence
42, and their fear over the carcinogenic effects of the sun were 
exacerbated by environmental reports regarding depletion of the Ozone.
43  Responding to 
increased consumer anxiety, the sunscreen industry transformed its products from 
                                                                                                                                                
carcinogenic effects can be found in a 1911 article published by Dr. Tozzer of Harvard medical 
School); See I. Muller, supra note 1, at 8. (explaining that by 1928 Finday was able to produce 
malignant skin tumors in albino mice using ultraviolet lamps and five years later Roffo published 
the first epidemiological study related to the problem of light induced cancer of the skin), some 
scientists still find the hypothesized link between UV radiation and melanoma in need of further 
evaluation. See Lui, supra note 40, at 337. But See, U. Ringborg, E.W. Breitbart, C.C.E. 
Meulemans, and C.J. M. De Wolf , Skin Cancer Prevention, in SKIN CANCER AND UV 
RADIATION 795, 812 (suggesting that intermittent sun exposure that produces sunburn is a major 
risk factor in the aetiology of malignant melanoma).  
41  See World Health Organization, Sun Protection: Simple Precautions in the Sun, 
http://www.who.int/uv/sun_protection/en/ (last visited April 20, 2009) (advising liberal use of a 
broad spectrum sunscreen containing at least SPF 15 as part of an overall sun protection 
program); Skin Caner Foundation, The SCF's guide to Sunscreen, http://www.skincancer.org/the-
scfs-guide-to-sunscreens.htm (last visited April 20, 2009) (describing the important protective 
function of sunscreens in association with other sun safety strategies). But c.f.,  Lui, supra note 
40, 340 (suggesting that there is no direct evidence that sunscreen use prevents the development 
of basal cell carcinoma or melanoma”).  
42 See e.g., Alexandra Greeley, On the Teen Scene, 27 FDA CONSUMER 30, 33 (noting that a 1989 
survey showed a 27% increase from an earlier survey in the number of the teens who were aware 
of the dangers of the sun 18% of whom specifically concerned about developing cancer). See 
also, Segrave supra note 2, at 88(explaining that “increasingly strident scare stories had alarmed 
the general public to worry more about the effects of sun exposure”).  
43 See e.g., James C.G. Conniff, Bask, Don’t Burn: Tan is beautiful, red is painful and too much 
ultraviolet is dumb and dangerous, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1974, 117. (noting that concern over the 
Ozone layer has increased fears of a worldwide skin cancer epidemic as a result of the potential 
increase in solar radiation reaching the earth's surface).  Sarah Matlack  
Food & Drug Law, Winter 2009  
  12 
entertainment/cosmetic products, meant to increase time spent having fun in the sun or to 
help achieve a certain a glowing appearance, into a health product.
44  
Many sunscreen products today offer high SPF and Broad Spectrum protection 
and are promoted not only to prevent sunburn but also to guard against other forms of sun 
damage such as skin cancer and photoaging.
45 Furthermore, the sunscreen industry has 
added daily-wear products to its more traditional beach/recreation lines and advertised 
sunscreen as a year-round purchase and an indispensable component of any skin care 
regimen.
46 It is important to note however, that despite the introduction of UVA 
protection in sunscreens and the expansion of sunscreen use, skin cancer rates have, so 
far, continued to climb with 1,00,000 new cases diagnosed every year.
47  
II. FDA & SUNSCREEN REGULATION.   
As the government agency responsible for protecting public health by assuring the 
safety and efficacy of human drugs, cosmetics, and the nation’s food supply, the Food 
and Drug Administration [“FDA”] has authority to regulate sunscreen products.
48 Since it 
was first implemented in 1972, sunscreen products have been regulated under FDA’s 
                                                 
44 See Segrave, supra note 2, at 88 (explaining that sunscreen manufacturers began to change their 
marketing at the end of the 1970s emphasizing sun protection aspects more and tanning aspects 
less).   
45 See e.g., Coppertone, http://www.coppertone.com/coppertone/products/products_ 
nutrashield.jsp (last visited April 20, 2009) (advertising that Coppertone Nutrashield Dual 
Defense helps prevent premature skin aging caused by the sun). Sunscreen products also make 
subtle skin cancer prevention claims by sporting the Skin Cancer Foundation Seal of Approval. 
See Breidi Caparatta, Sunscreen for Skin Cancer Survivors, Associated Content, June 17, 2008, 
available at http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/819309/sunscreen_for_skin_cancer_surviv 
ors_pg2.html?cat=5. 
46See Nadim A. Shaath & Mona Shaath, Recent Sunscreen Market Trends, in SUNSCREENS: 
REGULATIONS AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 929, 929-31 (Nadim A. Shaath ed., 2005).  
47  See, What you Need to Know about Skin Cancer, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics 
/wyntk/skin (last visited April 3, 2009). Some highly controversial studies have even suggested a 
correlation between sunscreen use and increased risk of skin cancer. See Lui, supra note 40, at 
337,  
48 See FDA’s Mission Statement, http://www.fda.gov/opacom /morechoices/mission.html (last 
visited April 3, 2009)  Sarah Matlack  
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monograph system, which was designed to assure the safety and efficacy of over-the-
counter drugs [“OTC drugs”].
49 Understanding the regulation of sunscreen products 
requires first an analysis of the both definitions of cosmetics and drugs under the FD&C 
Act and also the regulatory consequences of that distinction. Furthermore, it is necessary 
to distinguish the regulatory regime that applies to prescription drug products before 
exploring the OTC Monograph system. 
A. Cosmetics v. Drugs. 
Although the FD&C Act subjects cosmetics and drugs to distinct regulatory 
regimes, placing a product squarely within one definition is often difficulty.
50 Section 
201(g)(1) defines drugs, in part, as “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease” and “articles (other than food intended to 
affect the structure or any function of the body.”
51 Alternatively, Section 201(i) defines 
cosmetic as “articles intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled or sprayed on, introduced 
into, or otherwise applied to the human body or any part therefore for cleansing, 
beautifying, promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance.”
52 The evolving notion 
of the purpose of sunscreen, the multitude of diverse suncare products on the market, and 
the alternative uses of sunscreen active ingredients all complicate FDA’s task of placing 
these products within a regulatory category.  
The FD&C Act regulates drugs and cosmetics differently and the market 
consequences of this fact are enormous. Cosmetics are not subject to pre-market approval 
                                                 
49 See Procedures for Classification of Over-the-Counter Drugs, 37 Fed. Reg. 9,464, (May 11, 
1972) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130.); Charles C. Edwards, Closing the Gap: OTC Drugs, 6 FDA 
Papers 4, 4-8 (February 1972).  
50 See e.g., Michael Sandier, Regulation of Toothpaste (YEAR), in Chapter VI of the Electronic 
Book. (noting the difficulty of classifying toothpaste as a food, drug, or cosmetic).  
51 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act §201(g), 21 U.S.C. 321(g) (2008). 
52 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 201(i), 21 U.S.C. 321(i) (2008).  Sarah Matlack  
Food & Drug Law, Winter 2009  
  14 
for safety and efficacy and even post-market enforcement actions have mostly focused on 
products that endanger public safety.
53 The FDA first acquired authority over cosmetics 
under the 1938 Act, but the Act did not contain a provision for pre-market approval.
54 As 
a result “[n]either cosmetic products nor cosmetic ingredients are reviewed or approved 
by the FDA before they are sold to the public.”
55 Despite authority under §602 to bring 
enforcement actions against products with unsupported efficacy claims, FDA has 
generally failed to regulate unsubstantiated claims as per se misbranding and has instead 
focused on safety when bring enforcement action.”
56 As a result cosmetic companies 
continue to make questionable advertising and labeling claims to the detriment of 
consumers.
57  
  Drugs manufacturers, on the other hand, are required to substantiate safety and 
efficacy prior to consumer marketing. The 1938 Act first established a pre-market 
approval mechanism to ensure the safety of new drugs.
58 The pre-market approval 
process became far more onerous, however, in 1962 with the passage of the Kefauaver-
Harris Amendments requiring manufacturers to prove both safety and efficacy of all new 
                                                 
53 See Bryan A. Liang and Kurt M. Hartman, It’s Only Skin Deep: FDA Regulation of Skin Care 
Cosmetic Claims, 8 CNLJPP 249, 250 (1999); Laura A. Heyman, The Cosmetic/Drug Dilemma: 
FDA Regulation of Alpha-Hydroxy Acids, 52 Food Drug L.J. 357, 357 (1997).  
54 See Heyman, supra note 53, at 363.  
55 Joseph Dinardo, Regulations affecting cosmetic and over-the-counter drugs products, in 
REGULATORY TOXICOLOGY 167, 176 (Shayne C. Gad, ed. 2
nd ed. 1995).  
56See Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act §602, 21 U.S.C. §362 (2008) (establishing that a product 
should be considered misbranded if “its labeling is false or misleading in any particular”). See 
Liang, supra note 47, at 251-252 (suggesting that FDA’s policy against challenging such 
unsubstantiated claims as misbranding may be a result of its early losses court or may just reflect 
a policy decision to divert scarce agency resources). 
57See Id. at 251.  
58 See, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act §201(p), 21 U.S.C. §321(p) (2008); Peter Temin, TAKING 
YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (1980).  Sarah Matlack  
Food & Drug Law, Winter 2009  
  15 
drugs, including those approved between 1938 and 1962.
59 The amendment required that 
“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new 
drug, unless an approval of an application…is effective with respect to such drug.”
60 The 
application must include “full reports of investigations which have been made to show 
whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use.”
61 
Unlike the passive pre-market approval system established by the 1938 Act, where drug 
applications automatically became effective after 60 days unless the Secretary objected, 
the new drug application system required specific approval.
62 
Defining sunscreens as cosmetics or drugs effects every aspect of sunscreen 
development and marketing. The FDA determines the legal definition of a product by its 
intended use.
63  Under the modern rule intended use of a product may be based on claims 
made in labeling or other advertising, consumer perception, product reputation, and 
inclusion of active ingredients.
64 
Originally, the FDA distinguished sunscreen cosmetics from sunscreen drugs 
purely on the basis of labeling and advertising claims, effectively leaving the choice to 
manufacturers. In a 1940 Advisory Opinion, Trade Correspondence 61 (TC-61) the FDA 
established that “a product promoted for prevention of damage from the sun is a drug, 
and a product that is promoted solely for the purpose of acquiring an even tan can be 
                                                 
59 See Temin, supra note 58, at 131-132; W. Steven Pray, A HISTORY OF NONPRESCRIPTION 
PRODUCT REGULATION 171 (2003; Milestones in Food and Drug Law History, 
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html (last visited April 4, 2009). 
60 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780  (October 10, 1962).  
61 Id.  
62 See Temin supra note 58, 44; Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 505, 21 USC § 355.  
63 See Is it a drug, cosmetic or is it both? (or is it a soap?), July 8, 2002,  
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/cos-218.html ( last visited March 19, 2009).  
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considered a cosmetic.”
65 Products therefore were subject to cosmetic or drug regulations 
purely on the basis of whether the manufacture employed cosmetic claims or protective 
claims on its labels and in its advertising.
66 However, advances in scientific knowledge 
and consumer expectations caused the FDA to change its position on categorizing 
sunscreen products.
67 Sunscreens containing sunscreen active ingredients and making 
protective claims, typified by the traditional “beach product”, have always been and 
continue to be regulated as drugs: “essentially sunscreen active ingredient affect the 
structure and function of the body by absorbing, reflecting, or scattering the harmful, 
burning rays of the sun, thereby altering the normal physiological response to solar 
radiation.”
68 In order to protect the consumer from accidental and unwanted exposure to 
the sun, however, the FDA extended drug status to all products that “contain sunscreen 
ingredients, display labeling that identifies those active ingredients, or display labeling 
claims that allude to the sunblocking or sun-protection properties of those active 
ingredients.”
69 Thus suntan lotions – products promoted purely for the cosmetic benefit 
of obtaining a tan – are drugs if they contain a sunscreen active ingredient and traditional 
cosmetics containing sunscreen actives are drugs if they are marketed in part for sun-
protection capabilities.
70 Only suntan products without any suntan active ingredients, 
cosmetics containing suntan active ingredients for a non-therapeutic purpose, and sunless 
tanners continue to be regulated purely as cosmetics. FDA’s classification of all 
                                                 
65 Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Tentative Final Monograph, 58 
Fed. Reg. 2,8194, 28,204 (May 12, 1993).  
66 See Id.  
67 See Id.  
68 See Id.  
69 See Id. at  28,202. 
70 See Id. at 28, 204. It is important to note that a product can be considered both a cosmetic and a 
drug product and, therefore, subject to compliance with both regulations. See Id; Is it a drug, 
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sunscreen products that contain active ingredients and allude to sun-protection 
capabilities as drugs reflects FDA’s recognition of both the grave dangers of UV 
exposure and the high level of protection expected by today’s sunscreen consumers.
71  
 
B. Over-The-Counter Drugs and the History of the Monograph System.  
Traditionally most medicines were sold without the intervention of a doctor and 
prior to 1938 people could purchase any non-narcotic drug without a prescription.
72 A 
class of drugs inaccessible to the consumer without the supervision of a physician was 
first created in 1938 when the FD&C Act permitted drugs to omit directions for consumer 
use by adopting the statement: Caution: To be used only by or on the prescription of a 
Physician.
73 The Act, however, did not specify which drugs were to be sold by 
prescription, but left the decision entirely to the manufacturers.
74 In 1951, however, 
Congress passed the Humphrey-Durham Amendment specifically defining prescription 
drug as “any habit forming drug, any drug, so toxic or harmful that it required the 
supervision of a practitioner, or any new drug approved under the safety provision of the 
1938 act that had to be used under supervision.”
75 Any new drugs that could be used 
safely without medical supervision had to be marketed over-the-counter.
76 This new 
codified distinction did not have any significant regulatory consequences until the 1962 
Drug Amendments required new drugs to prove effectiveness by “substantial 
                                                 
71 Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Tentative Final Monograph, 58 
Fed. Reg. 2,8194, 28,204 (May 12, 1993). 
72 See Temin supra note 58, at 46.  
73 See Id. 
74 See Id. at 47.  
75 Durham-Humphrey Drug Prescriptions Act, Pub. L. No. 82-215, 65 Stat. 648 (October 26, 
1951).  
76 See Stan Stringer, Open Forum; What has Been Happening with Over-the-Counter Drug 
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evidence.”
77 Because the amendment also authorized FDA to withdrawal approval 
already granted to an NDA for a variety of causes including “lack of substantial evidence 
of effectiveness,” even drugs approved for sale prior to 1962 were required to comply 
with the new standards.
78  
Over four thousand drugs had been introduced between 1938 and 1962 and the 
FDA recognized that it could not evaluate them for effectiveness and still continue to 
perform other activities. To implement this new legislation, therefore, the FDA 
contracted with the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences to 
implement the DESI (Drug Efficacy Study Implementation) program.
79 Review began in 
1966 by 30 panels of experts examining the safety and efficacy of over 4,000 products 
that had entered the market between 1938 and 1962.
80 Although most products reviewed 
under DESI were prescription drugs, 422 OTC drugs were also reviewed.
81  
In 1972, with the DESI program well underway, the FDA turned to the 
formidable task of evaluating the estimated 300,000 to 500,000 over-the-counter drugs on 
the market for safety and efficacy.
82 The FDA however recognized that despite the large 
number of products, little more than 200 significant active ingredients were implicated 
and most of those ingredients had been marketed for years without negative health 
effects.
83 FDA opted not to implement a case-by-case approach like DESI because of the 
                                                 
77 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780  (October 10, 1962). 
78 Temin, supra note 58 , at 125.  
79 See Stringer, supra note 76, at 633; W. Steven Pray, HISTORY OF NONPRESCRIPTION PRODUCT 
REGULATION 173 (2003).  
80 See Edwards, supra note 49, at 5. 
81 See Id. See Also Pray, supra note 79, at 174 (suggesting that the high number of 
nonprescription drugs found to be ineffective or unsafe in this preliminary group led directly to an 
FDA decision to undertake a review of all nonprescription drug products).  
8282 See Edwards, supra note 49, at 5; Pray, supra note 77, at 174.  
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practical impossibility, the inherent unfairness of incremental enforcement, and the great 
number of drugs that would be exempt from safety and effectiveness testing under the 
grandfather provisions.
84 Instead FDA chose to proceed against OTC drugs through 
“rulemaking that will establish, define, and describe therapeutic classes or categories of 
these products on an industry wide basis and will outline parameters for each class by 
means of a monograph.”
85 The intended result was to ensure that only 2 routes to the 
market exist for manufacturers of OTC drugs (1) compliance with the monograph or (2) 
approval of noncompliance through a New Drug Application or monograph 
amendment.
86  
The FDA announced the OTC drug monograph system in 1972.
87 The project was 
designed as a three-step public rulemaking process in which active ingredients rather than 
final product formulations were reviewed for safety and efficacy.
88 FDA appointed 17 
independent advisory review panels, each consisting of scientific experts as well as 
industry and consumer representatives that were responsible for reviewing a specific 
therapeutic category.
89 Review panels (beginning with antacids in February 1972) 
reviewed each ingredient and published its findings as to whether it was (1) Category I – 
generally recognized as safe, generally recognized as effective (GRAS, GRAE), (2) 
Category II – not generally recognized as safe, not generally recognized as effective (Not 
GRAS, Not GRAE), or (3) Category III – more data needed, cannot determine safety 
                                                 
84 See Id.  
85 Id. at 7.  
86 See Id. at 8.   
87 See Procedures for Classification of Over-the-Counter Drugs, 37 Fed. Reg. 9,464 (May 11, 
1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130).  
88 See Matthew R. Holman & Daiva Shetty, The Role of FDA in Sunscreen Regulation, in 
SUNSCREENS: REGULATIONS AND COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT 85, 90  (Nadim A. Shaath ed., 3
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and/or effectiveness.
90 Each Panel also had to include in their findings acceptable active 
ingredient combinations, acceptable dosage ranges, acceptable indications for use, 
guidelines for labeling, and directions for consumer use.
91 After reviewing the panel’s 
findings the FDA was to publish in the federal register an Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ANPR).
92 Phase II of the review included an opportunity for manufacturers 
and other interested persons to respond to the ANPR by submitting data or appearing 
before the FDA committee.
93 After carefully considering all information and comments, 
the FDA would then issue the “Tentative Final monograph” detailing all research and 
comments submitted and the agency’s response.
94 In Phase III after permitting additional 
time for manufacturers to either reformulate or undertake additional investigative studies 
and considering all objections and comments (and holding hearings if warranted), the 
FDA was to close the record and issue a Final Monograph with an implementation date 
that grants industry sufficient time to comply with new provisions.
95  
Once a final monograph is in place, products must conform to monograph 
conditions, submit NDA for non-compliance, or attempt to have the monograph 
amended.
96 Once a monograph is final it can only be amended by a Citizen Petition (for 
conditions of use on the market prior to 1975) or a Time and Extent Application (TEA) 
(for new conditions of use).
97  
III. LATEST PROPOSED REGULATIONS REVEAL EFFORTS TO ACCOMMODATE NEW 
TECHNOLOGY, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, AND CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS.  
                                                 
90 See Id.  
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The science surrounding skin, UV radiation, cancer, and other forms of UV 
damage has dramatically expanded since FDA first issued proposed regulations for OTC 
sunscreen drug products in 1978.
98Although critics have attacked the FDA for its failure 
to keep up with the changing science and adequately protect consumers,
99 an analysis of 
the monograph history reveals a concerted effort to incorporate new technologies and 
address new health concerns at each step in the regulatory process.  
A. UVA Regulations. 
At the core of the 2007 Amendment is the proposed standard for UVA testing and 
labeling and no provision reflects more drastically the FDA’s efforts keep the sunscreen 
monograph consistent with advancing scientific knowledge. Incorporating UVA 
regulations into the sunscreen monograph essentially required entirely redefining the 
purpose of sunscreen products. Originally sunscreen was designed to protect consumers 
only from UVB radiation while allowing exposure to UVA rays or “tanning rays” to 
permit a tanning reaction.
100 
However, science began to rethink the conclusion that UVA rays were harmless 
when epidemiological observation revealed “that after years of exposure to solar 
radiation, notwithstanding the use of anti-UVB sunscreens, the skin of sun worshippers 
became severely damaged, sagging, and elastatoic.”
101 It was not until 1969 and into the 
1970s that early experiments performed with cultured cells began to reveal the ability of 
UVA rays to introduce nicks in cellular DNA.
102 The connection between molecular and 
                                                 
98 Natasha Singer, Do Sunscreens have you covered, N.Y. Times, July 5, 2007. 
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tissue effects of UVA radiation were not indicated more clearly until experiments with 
lab rodents were conducted in the late 1980s.
103 Even today, however there is only 
minimal evidence that sunscreen intervention will help prevent some forms of cancer and 
premature aging.
104 Incorporating UVA standards into the sunscreen monograph 
required, therefore, a complete redefinition of the purposes of sunscreen and reliance on 
continually changing and uncertain science.  
Although FDA recognized the danger posed by UVA radiation and the need for 
regulations well over a decade before the publication of the 2007 Amendment,
105 
scientific obstacles delayed the proposal of a uniform testing method. A huge impediment 
to UVA regulations was the lack of a scientifically valid test that could reliably measure 
all aspects of UVA protection provided by a sunscreen product.
106 Recognizing that the 
action spectra for UVA-induced skin damage is not well defined, FDA decided it was 
necessary to develop a method that could measure both the magnitude and the breadth of 
UVA protection.
107 FDA finally proposed not one, but two required UVA tests: an in-
vivo method to measure magnitude, or how well the product absorbs UV radiation and an 
in-vitro method to determine how broadly a product absorbs UVA radiation across the 
                                                 
103 See Id.  
104 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.  
105 See Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Tentative Final Monograph 
58 Fed. Reg. 28,194, 28,248-28,250 (May, 12 1993).  
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Over-the-Counter Human Use: Proposed Amendment of Final Monograph, 72 Fed. Reg. 49,070, 
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entire UVA spectrum.
108 The two-test method is necessary to compensate for the inherent 
disadvantages of each individual test.
109 The results of the tests are to be combined into a 
single labeled UVA rating.
110  Products will receive one of four ratings (low, medium, 
high and highest) corresponding to a four-star symbolic rating system that will allow 
consumers to use the rating system in combination with the SPF rating to make educated 
sunscreen purchases.
111 Furthermore, the FDA purposefully calculated the UVA rating-
system so the highest four-star rating is difficult if not impossible for current sunscreen 
formulations to achieve in order to “foster additional research and development in this 
area.
112 
B. WARNING STATEMENTS & OTHER CONSUMER EDUCATION EFFORTS  
The 2007 Amendment and the FM proposed several labeling conditions in an 
effort to help consumers make more informed purchases and to better educate consumers 
about the appropriate use of sunscreen as part of a broader sun-protection strategy. The 
2007 Amendment proposes replacing the optional sun alert statement with a mandatory 
warning: “UV exposure from the sun increases the risk of skin cancer, premature skin, 
aging and other skin damage. It is important to decrease UV exposure by limiting time in 
the sun, wearing protective clothing, and using a sunscreen.”
113 The statement is meant to 
encourage consumers to adopt a complete sun protection program (sunscreen, sun 
                                                 
108 See Id. at 49119 – 49, 121 (to be codified at 21 CFR 352).  
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See Id. at 49,104 -106. 
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111 See Id.  
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113 See Id. at 49,113; Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-The Counter Human Use; Final 
Monograph, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,666, 27, 689 (May 21, 1999) (to be codified at 21 CFR 352.52) 
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avoidance, and protective clothing) and to dispel any association of high SPF/broad-
spectrum protection with solar invincibility.
114 The Warning also disseminates 
information regarding the other potential dangers of UV radiation in a manner 
appropriate to the current state of scientific evidence.
115 
Both the FM and 2007 Amendment included other minor changes intended to 
minimize consumer misuse of sunscreen products. The FM prohibited terms like 
sunblock
116and waterproof
117 that have a high potential to mislead consumers about the 
level of protection provided by the product. To encourage consumers to seek out greater 
protection but to discourage extended UV exposure, the 2007 amendment proposes to 
allow the statement “higher SPF products give more sun protection, but are not intended 
to extend the time spent in the sun” but makes non-monograph an earlier proposed 
descriptor, “higher SPF products give more sun protection.”
118 The 2007 amendment also 
proposes to change the term Sun Protection Factor (SPF) to Sunburn Protection Factor to 
help reinforce the UVA/UVB distinction.
119 Furthermore, the 2007 Amendment proposes 
more detailed directions of use in order to reduce the systematic problems of under-
application and failure to re-apply that can significantly reduce the projected protection 
levels.
120 Although slight, these alterations reflect FDA’s commitment to on-going 
                                                 
114 See Sunscreen Drug products for Over-the-Counter Human Use: Proposed Amendment of 
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consumer education and desire to mend problems of persistent consumer misuse and 
misperceptions that systematically undermine the benefits of sunscreen products.  
C. ACTIVE INGREDIENTS.  
  The FDA has also taken steps to ensure that U.S. sunscreen manufactures have 
access to a greater number of active ingredients in order to promote the development of 
newer, more protective products. The OTC drug Review allows for interim marketing of 
products that do not yet have a final regulation provided that the product meets the 
material time/extent requirement.
121 Both products that were marketed in the United State 
prior to December 4, 1975 and products whose conditions (i.e., active ingredients, 
indications, dosage form, dosage strength, route of administration and active ingredient 
combinations) are “substantially indistinguishable” from the pre-1975 products 
presumptively meet the material time/extent provisions.
122 Inclusion of a new active 
ingredient in a sunscreen product, therefore, would render the product a “new drug” and 
require NDA approval.
123 Because obtaining an NDA is prohibitively costly and time-
consuming for sunscreen manufacturers, few new ingredients have been introduce into 
the OTC sunscreen marketplace since 1978.
124  
However, in the 1990s FDA considered a new process by which manufacturers 
could expedite approval of new sunscreen active ingredients called Time and Extent 
Applications.
125 The proposed rulemaking was the response to years of petitioning FDA 
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and lobbying Congress by European sunscreen manufacturers attempting to reverse the 
FDA policy of limiting OTC Drug Review to products with U.S. marketing 
experience
126.  
Time and Extent Applications were finally implemented in 2002 as a method by 
which conditions of use not present in the OTC marketplace prior to 1975 could be 
considered for inclusion in an OTC monograph.
127 Conditions may satisfy the material 
time/extent requirements when (1) conditions of use are found in drug products sold in 
the USA under NDAs (2) conditions are found in products sold outside the USA.
128 A 
TEA is a two-step process.
129 The manufacturer must first submit information to 
demonstrate that it has been marketed for a minimum of five continuous years in the 
same country and sufficient quantity.
130 After FDA reviews the marketing information 
and determines it is eligible to be included, FDA publishes a notice of eligibility and a 
request for data in the Federal Register and proceeds to review the ingredient for safety 
and effectiveness.
131 Finally a rulemaking is then published regarding FDA’s 
conclusions, and if the condition is considered GRASE, the monograph will be amended 
to allow the condition to be marketed.
132 Since implementing this process FDA has issued 
four eligibility notices proposing the inclusion of 7 active ingredients in the sunscreen 
FM.
133  
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D. PHOTOSTABILITY 
  The 2007 Amendment also addresses photostability (the ability of sunscreen to 
resist photoinactivation at various wavelengths)
134 of sunscreen drug products. Interest in 
sunscreen photostability has grown with the popularity of avobenzone as a sunscreen 
active ingredient.
135 Although it is one of the most widely used UVA filters in the world, 
its absorbance performance has been shown, under certain experimental conditions, to 
decline with exposure to UV radiation.
136 This photodegredation can result in consumers 
receiving less sunscreen protection than they expect.
137 When FDA first approved 
avobenzone for inclusion in the FM, the agency recognized “that the photostability of any 
topical product, particularly a sunscreen drug product, is an important safety and 
effectiveness consideration” and promised to address the issue of photostability of all 
OTC sunscreen active ingredients in a future issue of the Federal Register.
138 
Subsequently, a public meeting was held to obtain data and information on the 
photochemistry and photobiology of all OTC sunscreen drug products.
139 The FDA 
expressed particular concern with loss of product effectiveness and safety risks raised by 
the production of potentially toxic byproducts as a result photodegredation.
140 In the 2007 
                                                                                                                                                
(December 5, 2005) (announcing notice of eligibility and call-for-data on bisoctrizole and 
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Amendment, in conjunction with the UVA regulations, the FDA proposed a pre-
irradiation step to the in vitro test method.
141  FDA’s proposal of a pre-irradiation step is 
intended to reduce the number of unstable product formulations and protect consumers 
from an unexpected loss of product effectiveness during actual use.
142 
Each of the provisions and changes discussed in this section belies criticism that 
FDA has done little to advance consumer protection in the area of sunscreen drug 
products. FDA has responded to the sunscreen evolution by completely redefining 
sunscreen products, educating consumers, creating easier pathways for the introduction of 
new technology, and devising solutions to novel problems that accompany that 
technology. 
 
IV. THREATS TO CONSUMER SAFETY.  
  Although the regulatory history for OTC sunscreen drug products reveals a 
relatively flexible, albeit prolonged, process that has permitted FDA to adjust the 
monograph to accommodate ever-changing science and technology in the field of UV 
protection, the absence of a Final Monograph continues to threaten the public health. This 
section addresses the pressing need for finalized regulations and analyzes one current 
source of delay – opposition by industry to certain labeling provisions that allegedly 
violate their right to commercial free speech. The last part of the section also identifies 
areas where further action by FDA may be required to adequately protect consumers, 
including UVA regulations, photostability, nanotechnology, and active ingredient 
approval.  
A. THE NEED FOR AN FINAL MONOGRAPH. 
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  FDA technically has the power to take enforcement action against sunscreen 
products that are marketed in formulations not in accordance with the proposed 
monograph.
143 However,  
a well-understood premise of the OTC Drug Review was that FDA would not 
devote its resources to enforcement actions against individual OTC products even 
though they might technically be unapproved new drugs…the agency would 
tolerate continued marketing of most OTC drug products pending completion of 
the Review.
144  
Although the FDA has made clear that it will not hesitate to take action against individual 
products that pose significant health hazards or are likely to defraud consumers, it has not 
taken such actions against OTC sunscreen products.
145As a result sunscreen products 
have persisted in disregarding FDA determinations of what constitutes safe and effective 
conditions for sunscreen drug products.
146 FDA must finalize the monograph and strictly 
enforce its provisions in order to ensure that consumers are adequately protected.
147 
B. INFORMAL INDUSTRY FILIBUSTER: COMMERCIAL FREE SPEECH.  
  The multi-step rulemaking process employed in the OTC Review provides 
opportunity for any interested person to comment during several stages of the rulemaking 
and requires FDA to review to review all comments and new information before 
progressing to the next phase of review.
148 As a result, industry’s response to FDA’s 
proposed regulations can have a tremendous effect on the pace of the regulatory process. 
Although the “agency has a history of proposing, amending, and staying sunscreen rules” 
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the current delay has sparked outrage among consumer advocates “who blame sunscreen 
manufacturers for filibustering.”
149 The Industry opposes an SPF cap and prohibitions of 
therapeutic claims other than sunburn prevention claiming that the rules impermissibly 
restrict their First Amendment right to commercial free speech.
150  
Although the 2007 amendment proposes to increase the cap on specific SPF value 
claims to SPF 50 and to allow the use of a collective category SPF 50+, this concession 
has done little to decrease industry’s concerns over their free speech rights.
151 SPF 
labeling has been a controversial topic throughout the OTC review of sunscreen 
products.
152 The FDA first proposed the SPF coding system in the ANPR in 1978.
153 
Manufacturers quickly adopted the coding system, but ignored the FDA’s position that 
SPFs over 15 were unwarranted.
154 Recognizing the popularity of high SPF products, 
recommendations by medical professionals, and new evidence that high SPF numbers 
may be warranted under extreme conditions, for the most light sensitive individuals, or to 
compensate for systematic under-application, FDA proposed in the TFM to allow for 
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specific value claims up to 30, and created a collective category of 30+ in the FM. 
155 
After publication of the FM, affected companies threatened to bring a lawsuit against 
FDA challenging the constitutionality of the restrictions on truthful, non-misleading 
commercial speech.
156 In the 2007 Amendment the FDA has backpedaled further, not 
only raising the SPF cap to 50 and the collective category to SPF 50+, but also 
abandoning their prior consumer protection rationale and relying solely on adequate 
testing procedures.
157 FDA essentially promised to recognize specific values over SPF 50 
“upon receipt of data demonstrating that accurate and reproducible results can be 
obtained from the SPF test for sunscreen products with SPF Values over 50”
158 
Despite or perhaps because of FDA’s conciliations, the industry continues to 
oppose any FDA cap on SPF values and also to advocate for the inclusion of “helps 
prevent” claims related to photoaging and skin cancer.
159 Both the popularity of high SPF 
products and the obvious marketing potential for anti-aging/anti-skin cancer claims, make 
it unlikely that industry will submit to FDA’s regulations without a fight. It is essential 
that FDA resolve the debate in a manner that is in accordance with the constitutional 
doctrine, thereby reducing the likelihood of a challenge, but also consistent with its 
mission of protecting of consumer health.  
C. CONSUMER PROTECTION: PERSISTING GAPS IN THE PROPOSED RULES.  
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  Despite FDA’s efforts to formulate regulations that protect consumers from the 
dangers of UVA radiation, there remains several gaps in the proposed rules that continue 
to threaten consumer safety and will require future action by FDA.
160 In particular FDA 
will likely need to further address some issues with UVA testing and labeling, 
nanomaterials, photodegredation, and the inability of U.S. consumers to access the 
newest, most effective sunscreen active ingredients on the world market.  
Although the UVA regulations in the 2007 Amendment are undoubtedly a 
monumental step forward for consumer safety, neither industry nor consumer groups are 
totally satisfied with the proposed regulation. Consumer advocates are concerned about 
the failure of the proposed test methods to measure UVA radiation from a statistically 
significant endpoint.
161 Furthermore, the proposed test methods are inconsistent with the 
foreign standard thereby widening the regulatory gaps that prevent flow of products 
between markets.
162 Industry also complains that the UVA four-star rating is an arbitrary 
and impossible standard.
163 Furthermore, consumer advocates believe that FDA should 
require manufacturers to include a minimum level of UVA protection, much like a 
minimum SPF value is required to qualify as a sunscreen.
164 Although future fine-tuning 
of the UVA regulation will likely be necessary, finalizing the proposed 2007 amendment 
will provide consumers a solid base of protection even while FDA and sunscreen 
manufactures continue to test the best labeling and testing methods for UVA radiation. 
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Furthermore, FDA’s failure to seriously address the use of nanoparticles risks 
consumer health. Within the last twenty-five years scientists have learned to manipulate 
nanosized particles and cosmetic and personal product manufacturers have taken 
advantage of the special properties of nanomaterials and incorporated them into their 
products.
165 Despite concern over a lack of information regarding the potential health 
dangers of this new tiny technology,
166 it is estimated that hundreds of products, 
including many sunscreens, contain nanoparticles.
167 In the FM, “after reviewing limited 
toxicity data, the FDA expressed the view that ‘micronized’ titanium dioxide is not a new 
drug ingredient, despite the functional differences between it and larger particles of the 
substance.”
168 As a result of this decision, sunscreens containing nanomaterials will not 
be subject to further assessment or oversight.
169 Consumer and environmental advocates 
indicate that human health and toxicity concerns exist for nano-ingredients and believes 
that the Agency must establish reporting requirements for manufactures regarding 
particle size and conduct more thorough investigations to establish safety of use, 
specifically for titanium dioxide and zinc oxide in order to ensure consumer safety.
170 
  Furthermore, some consumer groups feel that the pre-irradiation step in the UVA 
testing procedures is insufficient to address the serious problem of photodegredation.
171 
Some research shows that as many as 53% of sunscreen products on the market contain at 
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least one ingredient that may be unstable and a number of scientific studies have shown 
the potential for sunscreen ingredients and formulations to lose effectiveness or degrade 
into potentially toxic by-products when exposed to normal exposure levels of UV 
radiation.
172 Although both the in vivo SPF testing and the proposed UVA pre- irradiation 
step attempt to address the problem of photostability, these protections may not be 
sufficient, because manufacturers are not required to ensure the safety of chemical 
degradation byproducts and the proposed UVA method fails to adequately simulate 
conditions of actual exposure.
173   
Finally, the number of FDA approved UV filters available to manufactures 
remains completely insufficient to allow the production of sunscreen formulations that 
will best protect the consumer. Although the TEA process was intended to streamline the 
approval process for new active ingredients, the lag time is still extreme.
174 Only 17 
chemicals are approved for use in the U.S. while at least 29 are approved for use in the 
E.U.
175 The dearth of adequate products has led to both deceptive and inefficient 
manufacturing processes. For example manufacturers have begun to incorporate anti-
inflammatory ingredients into their products to artificially boost SPF, an entire market of 
photostabilizing methods have been developed to enhance the available UVA ingredients 
such as avobenzone, and manufacturers have begun incorporating unapproved active 
ingredients into their formulations as inactive ingredients.
176 Without more expedient 
review and approval of new UV filters, U.S. consumers will continue to be considerably 
disadvantaged as newer, safer and more efficient technologies continue to be introduced 
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in places like Europe, Australia and Canada where the regulation of sunscreen is more 
progressive. 
CONCLUSION.  
FDA’s delay in finalizing a sunscreen monograph has been in some ways 
necessary to accommodate a radical change in the science surrounding sunscreen, skin 
damage, and UV radiation. However, the lack of a finalized sunscreen regulation is a 
detriment to consumer health, especially as sunscreen manufacturers persist in marketing 
non-monograph conditions. FDA’s desire to keep the regulations abreast of developing 
technology and science likely reflects a desire to minimize economic costs to 
manufacturers.
177 FDA must balance the economic burden to manufactures with the cost 
of delay to consumers. Although continued flexibility in the sunscreen monograph is 
essential to accommodate continued research into new conditions and effective uses, 
FDA must finalize the sunscreen drug monograph and enforce its provisions strictly to 
ensure that consumers can have confidence in their sunscreen purchases.  
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